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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT  
_____________ 
 
No. 11-1311 
_____________ 
 
T.J.S. MINING, INC.; ROCKWOOD CASUALTY INS. CO., 
                                          Petitioners 
 
v. 
 
RONALD M. PATRICK; DIRECTOR OWCP,  
United States Department of Labor, 
                        Respondents 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the Benefits Review Board 
 (BRB-1:10-0215 BLA) 
Administrative Law Judge:  Hon. Thomas M. Burke 
_______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2013 
 
Before:   JORDAN, GREENBERG and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: June 14, 2013) 
 _______________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 _______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 T.J.S. Mining, Inc., and Rockwood Casualty Insurance Company (collectively, 
“Petitioners”) seek review of an order by the Benefits Review Board (the “Board”) 
affirming an award of disability benefits to Ronald M. Patrick pursuant to the Black Lung 
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Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq.  For the reasons that follow, we will deny the 
petition. 
I. Background 
 Patrick worked as a coal miner from February 1968 until May 2004, when he quit 
because of breathing problems.  His last position was with T.J.S. Mining as a foreman 
responsible for examining the face of the coal mine, its beltline, and its return air course.  
His work required him to regularly travel almost a mile on his hands and knees through 
the mine.  He put his lungs at further risk by heavy smoking, averaging a pack of 
cigarettes a day from the time he was 16 to when he was 60.  (He is now 68 years old).  
Patrick sought lifetime benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act (the “Act”) because 
he believes he suffers from a respiratory condition known as pneumoconiosis, which can 
be caused by exposure to coal dust.  He filed his claim pursuant to the Act on September 
19, 2006.  
 To recover under the Act, Patrick was required to establish, by a preponderance of 
the evidence, that (1) he has pneumoconiosis; (2) it arose from his coal mine 
employment; and (3) it caused him “total disability.”  20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-204.  At the 
administrative hearing, the parties stipulated that Patrick had worked in the coal mine for 
35.26 years.  Petitioners also agreed that Patrick was totally disabled due to a respiratory 
condition.  The issues and evidence presented to the ALJ focused on whether Patrick’s 
total disability was caused by his coal mine employment or by his history of smoking.
1
  
                                              
1
 It is undisputed that Patrick does not have medically diagnosed pneumoconiosis.  
Instead, he seeks recovery for “legal pneumoconiosis.”  Whether or not one has been 
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In that regard, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) reviewed copious medical evidence, 
including, for example, ten x-ray results (some positive for pneumoconiosis, some 
negative), arterial blood gas tests, FEV-1 tests,
2
 and other pulmonary function tests.   
In addition, and particularly relevant to this appeal, the ALJ reviewed the medical 
reports and testimony of Drs. John Schaaf, Christopher Begley, Gregory Fino, and Peter 
Kaplan, who each opined about the presence of pneumoconiosis after examining Patrick, 
performing tests, and reviewing chest x-rays.
3
  Drs. Schaaf and Begley both concluded 
that Patrick suffered from pneumoconiosis, as broadly defined by regulation, and that his 
respiratory condition was caused by his exposure to coal dust, which in turn is a 
substantial cause of his total disability.  Drs. Fino and Kaplan, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                  
diagnosed with having the specific disease bearing the name “pneumoconiosis,” recovery 
is still available under the rubric of “legal pneumoconiosis,” which, by regulatory 
definition, is expansive enough to permit recovery under the Act for a variety of  
breathing impairments arising from coal mine employment.  20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2); 
see Hill v. Dir., OWCP, 562 F.3d 264, 270 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting the definition of legal 
pneumoconiosis is much broader than the medical definition).  The parties do not dispute 
that Patrick suffers from a disabling breathing impairment; therefore, the entire dispute 
centers around whether that impairment arose from his coal mine employment or his 
smoking. 
 
2
 FEV-1 (standing for forced expiratory volume) is “[t]he most useful 
measurement” when assessing coal workers’ pneumoconiosis; it corresponds to “the 
volume of air exhaled during the first second of a forced exhalation after a maximal 
inspiration.”  15 Jacqueline Moline & Stephanie Golden, Coal Workers’ Pneumoconiosis, 
in Attorneys’ Textbook of Medicine ¶ 205B.64(1) (3d ed. 1994). 
 
3
 The ALJ also briefly discussed the opinion of Dr. Imran Bajwa, who concluded 
that Patrick’s breathing problems were caused by both smoking and coal dust.  But Dr. 
Bajwa did not opine on whether the coal dust was a significant factor in Patrick’s 
breathing problems, and the ALJ then stated that that opinion did not establish 
pneumoconiosis.  Petitioners do not raise any concerns about Dr. Bajwa’s opinion or the 
ALJ’s discussion of that opinion in their petition for review.   
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concluded that Patrick did not suffer from pneumoconiosis, and that his total disability 
was caused by smoking. 
The ALJ credited the opinions of Drs. Schaaf and Begley as “reasoned and 
documented” and stated that those opinions “thoroughly and persuasively” explained why 
Patrick suffered from pneumoconiosis, as that term is defined by the pertinent 
regulations.  (App. at 20.)  The ALJ rejected the opinions of Drs. Fino and Kaplan, 
however, because, in his view, both doctors impermissibly based their opinions on 
generalized studies of exposure to coal dust and seemed to require, contrary to federal 
regulations, a positive x-ray for a finding of legal pneumoconiosis.  The ALJ then granted 
Patrick benefits pursuant to the Act.   
Petitioners appealed that decision to the Board, claiming that the ALJ improperly 
rejected the medical opinions of Drs. Fino and Kaplan.  The Board affirmed the ALJ’s 
award of benefits.  It agreed with the ALJ’s rejection of those opinions as being based 
upon evidence and inferences contrary to what is permitted under the Act and federal 
regulations.   
Petitioners timely sought review of that decision. 
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 II. Discussion
4
  
 The Black Lung Benefits Act defines “pneumoconiosis” as “a chronic dust disease 
of the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising 
out of coal mine employment.”  30 U.S.C. § 902(b).  As already noted, a claimant 
seeking benefits must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) he has 
pneumoconiosis; (2) it arose from his coal mine employment; and (3) it caused him total 
disability.  20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-204.  Pneumoconiosis is taken to be the actionable 
cause of total disability if it is a “substantially contributing cause” of the disability.  Id. 
§718.204(c).  A “substantially contributing cause” of the disability occurs when the 
disease either (1) has “a material adverse effect on the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary 
condition” or (2) “[m]aterially worsens a totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary 
impairment which is caused by a disease or exposure unrelated to coal mine 
employment.”  Id.     
                                              
4
 The ALJ and the Board had jurisdiction pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) and 33 
U.S.C. § 921(b).  We have jurisdiction under 30 U.S.C. § 932(a) and 33 U.S.C. § 921(c).  
We review Board decisions for errors of law, and for whether the Board adhered to its 
own standard of review.  Lombardy v. Dir., OWCP, 355 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2004).  
We review questions of law de novo.  Id.  The Board is bound, as are we, by the ALJ’s 
findings of fact, if those findings are supported by substantial evidence.  Id.  In cases 
where a party challenges a finding of fact by the Board or the ALJ, we independently 
review the record and decide whether that finding is supported by substantial evidence.  
Helen Min. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 650 F.3d 248, 254 (3d Cir. 2011).  Substantial evidence is 
“such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 
conclusion.”  Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002).  
Under that standard, we will not upset an ALJ’s factual findings if supported by 
substantial evidence, even if we “might have interpreted the evidence differently in the 
first instance.”  Balsavage v. Dir., OWCP, 295 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
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Again as previously noted (see supra note 1), a diagnosis of pneumoconiosis for 
purposes of recovering benefits can be either a “clinical” diagnosis or a “legal” one.  
“Clinical pneumoconiosis consists of those diseases recognized by the medical 
community as pneumoconioses … .”  Id. § 718.201(a)(1) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  “Legal pneumoconiosis includes any chronic lung disease or impairment and 
its sequelae arising out of coal mine employment.  This definition includes, but is not 
limited to, any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal 
mine employment.”  Id. § 718.201(a)(2) (internal quotation marks omitted).  For 
example, chronic bronchitis, as well as emphysema and certain types of asthma, are all 
possible species of legal pneumoconiosis.  See Regulations Implementing the Federal 
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,920, 79,939 (Dec. 20, 2000) 
(“The considerable body of literature documenting coal mine dust exposure’s causal 
effect on the development of chronic bronchitis, emphysema and associated airways 
obstruction constitutes a clear and substantial basis for [the definition of legal 
pneumoconiosis].”).  A diagnosis of “pneumoconiosis,” in a legal sense, can be 
established by way of x-ray evidence, biopsy or autopsy results, legal presumptions under 
20 C.F.R. §§ 718.304-306, or reasoned medical opinions.  20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a).  All 
such evidence is to be weighed together to determine the existence of pneumoconiosis.  
Penn Allegheny Coal Co. v. Williams, 114 F.3d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1997).   
It is undisputed that, as the ALJ concluded, Patrick’s x-ray evidence did not 
establish that he suffered from clinical pneumoconiosis.  Nor did Patrick submit biopsy 
results or argue that he was entitled to any of the presumptions from 20 C.F.R. §§ 
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718.304-306.  His diagnosis was dependent solely upon the medical opinions of the four 
doctors, as described above.  Petitioners do not deny that Drs. Schaaf and Begley 
concluded that Patrick suffered from legal pneumoconiosis substantially contributing to 
his pulmonary disability.  They only challenge the reasons for the ALJ’s rejection of the 
contrary opinions of Drs. Fino and Kaplan.  We turn, then, to a consideration of whether 
the ALJ erred in rejecting those opinions. 
 The ALJ refused to credit Dr. Fino’s opinion for several reasons.  Dr. Fino 
concluded that Patrick’s pulmonary function tests worsened over a short period of time 
(about one year, from 2007 to 2008) and that that was indicative of smoking, not coal 
dust exposure.  The ALJ concluded, however, that the record did not support that 
assertion because Patrick testified his breathing had continually worsened since he left 
the coal mine in 2004, and the record also indicated that, taking into account the several 
physicians that examined Patrick, his objective breathing tests exhibited little variability.   
Moreover, the ALJ concluded that Dr. Fino impermissibly based his opinion about 
Patrick’s loss of FEV-1 on the average loss shown in a statistical study of coal miners. 
Lastly, the ALJ rejected Dr. Fino’s opinion because he ruled out coal dust as a cause of 
Patrick’s total pulmonary disability because of Patrick’s negative x-ray.  Specifically, the 
ALJ explained that Dr. Fino testified that studies show that a person with a negative x-ray 
has no more than ten percent increased emphysema.  The ALJ interpreted that testimony 
to mean that Dr. Fino would not conclude that Patrick had emphysema sufficient for 
recovery under the Act without a positive x-ray.  Therefore, according to the ALJ, Dr. 
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Fino’s opinion was inconsistent with 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4),5 which, in the ALJ’s 
words, “explicitly allows for a finding of a totally disabling obstructive pulmonary 
disease caused by coal dust exposure, notwithstanding a negative x-ray.”  (App. at 21.)   
The ALJ rejected Dr. Kaplan’s opinion for similar reasons.  Specifically, the ALJ 
concluded that Dr. Kaplan, contrary to § 718.202(a)(4), would not diagnose emphysema 
from coal dust exposure without a positive x-ray.  The ALJ also rejected Dr. Kaplan’s 
opinion because he too relied upon generalized studies of coal miners when assessing 
Patrick’s condition.  In sum, the ALJ concluded, “[t]he reasoning of Dr. Fino and Dr. 
Kaplan for finding the obstructive lung disease to be caused by cigarette smoking without 
a significant contribution by coal dust exposure is not accepted because … it is contrary 
to the Act and regulations.”  (App. at 21.) 
 Petitioners argue with respect to Dr. Fino that, contrary to the ALJ’s findings, he 
based his conclusions on Patrick’s actual pulmonary function test results, not just on a 
generalized study.  In support, they cite one paragraph from Dr. Fino’s deposition in 
which he discussed Patrick’s drop off in FEV-1 results from July 2007 to May 2008 of 
about 33 percent.  There, Dr. Fino opined that one does not generally see that amount of 
loss in individuals that have coal dust exposure, and he concluded that that loss was 
because of lung disease related to smoking, not coal dust exposure.  Petitioners also argue 
that Dr. Fino did not impermissibly rely upon Patrick’s negative x-ray in his diagnosis 
                                              
5
 That regulation provides as follows: “A determination of the existence of 
pneumoconiosis may also be made if a physician, exercising sound medical judgment, 
notwithstanding a negative X-ray, finds that the miner suffers or suffered from 
pneumoconiosis … .”  20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4). 
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because he testified that even a positive x-ray might not, in every case, lead to a diagnosis 
of pneumoconiosis because, in general, a positive x-ray for lung obstruction corresponds 
to a clinically insignificant loss of FEV-1 when comparing miners to non-miners.      
Those selections from the record are unavailing.  Dr. Fino was asked specifically 
what role coal mine employment played in Patrick’s development of pulmonary 
disability, and he responded by referring to an epidemiologic study that showed the 
average FEV-1 loss for coal miners.  Although Patrick’s FEV-1 reading was somewhat 
worse than average, Dr. Fino considered it as approximately average and said, “I don’t 
believe that this man has any more than an average loss of FEV-1 due to coal mine dust.”  
(App. at 114.)  Apparently, Dr. Fino then concluded that the disabling lung condition that 
Patrick has must have been due to causes other than coal dust exposure.  Under our 
deferential standard of review, we cannot say that the ALJ erred in dismissing Dr. Fino’s 
opinion because it was based on the generalized epidemiologic study and did not 
adequately  consider the specifics of Patrick’s case.  See 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,940-45 
(rejecting as inconsistent with the focus of legal pneumoconiosis generalized FEV-1 
studies and results performed by Dr. Fino and others). 
 The ALJ also did not err in rejecting Dr. Kaplan’s opinion.  Petitioners argue that 
Dr. Kaplan specifically explained after looking at all of the medical evidence that 
Patrick’s breathing problems – which were in Dr. Kaplan’s view a result of emphysema – 
were caused by smoking, not by coal dust exposure.  But Dr. Kaplan indicated that he 
would require a diagnosis of clinical pneumoconiosis before allowing that Patrick’s 
breathing problems could be called “pneumoconiosis” in any sense.  As explained above, 
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clinical pneumoconiosis and legal pneumoconiosis are separate concepts, either of which 
is sufficient to enable a claimant to recover benefits.  Dr. Kaplan appears to require a 
clinical diagnosis for what would be an otherwise sufficient legal basis for calling 
Patrick’s condition pneumoconiosis.  That conclusion is contrary to the regulatory 
framework under the Act.  Accordingly, the ALJ could permissibly reject Dr. Kaplan’s 
opinion.  See Helen Min. Co. v. Dir., OWCP, 650 F.3d 248, 256-57 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(affirming an ALJ’s rejection of medical testimony as contrary to the Act and regulations 
where it appeared to require a finding of a positive x-ray for a diagnosis of legal 
pneumoconiosis).   
 Because the ALJ was within the bounds of discretion in declining to credit Dr. 
Fino’s and Dr. Kaplan’s opinions, and because there was “such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support … [the ALJ’s] conclusion,” 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002), the award of 
benefits to Patrick was justified and the Board did not err in affirming it. 
III. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
